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Learning of feature-based categories is known to interact with feature-variation in a variety
of ways, depending on the type of variation (e.g., Markman and Maddox, 2003). However,
relational categories are distinct from feature-based categories in that they determine
membership based on structural similarities. As a result, the way that they interact with
feature variation is unclear. This paper explores both experimental and computational data
and argues that, despite its reliance on structural factors, relational category-learning should
still be affected by the type of feature variation present during the learning process.
It speciﬁcally suggests that within-feature and across-feature variation should produce
different learning trajectories due to a difference in representational cost. The paper then
uses the DORA model (Doumas et al., 2008) to discuss how this account might function
in a cognitive system before presenting an experiment aimed at testing this account. The
experiment was a relational category-learning task and was run on human participants and
then simulated in DORA. Both sets of results indicated that learning a relational category
from a training set with a lower amount of variation is easier, but that learning from a
training set with increased within-feature variation is signiﬁcantly less challenging than
learning from a set with increased across-feature variation.These results support the claim
that, like feature-based category-learning, relational category-learning is sensitive to the
type of feature variation in the training set.
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INTRODUCTION
If one hears the words “ocean,” “mountain,” “hill,” “lake,” “river,”
and “valley,” it is likely that one will separate the words into
two groups—instances of bodies of water, and instances of land-
based structures (possibly without even being prompted). The
tendency to group things based on shared qualities is the basis for
categorization—a process that humans perform quickly and fre-
quently (e.g., Maddox et al., 2004). Categorization not only gives
humans the ability to identify instances of a given category, but
to also make predictions about novel items given knowledge of
their category membership (Anderson, 1990; Markman and Ross,
2003). For example, categorization allows us to realize that we
should be able to swim before we set about exploring an ocean,
but that swimming is likely an unimportant ability if we intend to
visit a mountain.
Strictly speaking, categories are sets; while set members may
differ in some way, they share some common property (Markman
and Maddox, 2003). That said, similarity is not the only impor-
tant aspect of category knowledge and data has suggested that
thinking about categories often relies on qualitative judgments
about the relevancy of object properties and the degree to which
objects share some set of them (Hammer et al., 2008, 2009a). As a
result, categorization research has highlighted the importance of
those properties, or features (Gentner and Kurtz, 2005). Typically,
it has been found that category-learning becomes more chal-
lenging when features show greater amounts of variation across
exemplars. For instance, Yamauchi and Markman (2000) used an
experiment involving a family resemblance structure to show that
irrelevant feature variation (i.e., a greater number of possible fea-
ture manifestations) made category-learning much harder, if not
impossible.
There are exceptions though. Markman and Maddox (2003)
pointed out that Yamauchi and Markman (2000) only exploited
the variation of “exception features.” Exception features are non-
typical of a category, but may be consistent with the prototype
of another (Yamauchi and Markman, 2000). Variation in these
features across exemplars means that the categories may appear
more similar, thereby reducing one’s ability to delineate the cate-
gories. Thus, Markman and Maddox (2003) not only replicated
the increased difﬁculty associated with exception features, but
also explored how non-diagnostic feature variation (i.e., features
that are not relevant or prototypical of any category) can affect
category-learning. They found that this type of variation actually
made category-learning easier. As a result, understanding the type
of feature variation that a category-learning task is using, and the
source of that variation, is important for predicting how it will
affect participant performance.
However, as Markman and Stilwell (2001) and Gentner and
Kurtz (2005) have pointed out, not all categories are built the
same. There is a fundamental difference between a category of
“blue things” and one of “things that are above other things”—
the former can be evaluated by looking at an object, while the
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later requires one to evaluate the role that a thing plays in rela-
tion to another thing. The previously mentioned work (along
with the majority of the existing category-learning literature)
focuses on the former, which are called feature-based categories.
This paper will deal with the later, which are called relational
categories.
Relational categories are built on relational representations,
which can be thought of as functions that assign some truth-value
to an ordered k-tuple (see Gentner, 1989), and generally specify
an actor and a patient. For example, “the dog chases the cat” is
a relational statement that binds “dog” to the actor role, “cat” to
the patient role, and can be evaluated as true or false. Importantly
though, these bindings are dynamic, and the roles are independent
of their ﬁllers (Doumas et al., 2008). So, chasing means something
independent of dogs and cats, and can take any number of objects
as its elements (people, octopuses, political campaigns, etc.).
Thinking about relational categories, and relations in general,
involves more or less ignoring the features of the objects in the
class (i.e., the types of features that are typically important for
most feature-based categorization; e.g., Markman and Stilwell,
2001). For example, while “blue things” comprise a feature-based
category because all blue things share approximately the same hue,
“above” things are deﬁned by how they stand in relation to“below”
things—their shared features can be sparse (or even non-existent)
and are unimportant to their class membership. Thus, people,
grades, cars, and octopuses can all equally be above other things
and therefore included in the category, despite sharing few featural
similarities.
There are at least two subtypes of relational categories (Mark-
man and Stilwell, 2001; Gentner, 2005): (i) categories that involve
objects that fulﬁll the same relational role, and so are engaged in
the same relation (e.g., “things that are above other things”), and
(ii) relational schemas that are deﬁned by some internal relational
structure that takes arguments (e.g., “transactions” are a class of
situations which specify at least two individuals, and a good or
service that is being transferred). However, both subtypes are role-
focused instead of feature-focused and therefore fundamentally
differ from feature-based categories.
Thus, while there is a wealth of literature on the complex
ways that features and their variation across a category affects
learning (e.g., also see Hammer et al., 2008, 2009a,b), there is
little on how feature variation might affect relational category-
learning. This gap in the literature is problematic because these
two types of category-learning do not rely on equivalent mech-
anisms: relation-based category-learning relies on the difﬁcult
process of noticing and maintaining role-bindings (i.e., noticing
which relational role an object ﬁlls, while potentially ignoring its
features), while feature-based category-learning does not (Gen-
tner and Kurtz, 2005; Doumas and Hummel, 2013). This gap is
even more problematic with the realization that the literature is
conﬂicted on the role that features play in relational reasoning in
general.
To the point, because relational reasoning relies on shared rela-
tional structures, object features can be distracting. For instance,
cross-mappings are analogy problems that afford an answer (i.e., a
mapping) based either on features or roles, butwhere the two result
in different mappings (Gentner andMarkman, 1997). So, if one is
asked to complete the analogy task in Figure 1, and tomap the two
shapes on the left to the two shapes on the right, one could proceed
in two different ways: (i) one could map featurally, by aligning the
two squares and the two circles, or (ii) one could map relation-
ally, by aligning the two “above” things [which can be described
as mapping above(circle, square) to above(square, circle)]. While
there is evidence to suggest that adult humans prefer relational
mappings (Ratterman and Gentner, 1987; Markman and Gen-
tner, 1993), distractions can promote featural mappings instead.
For instance,Waltz et al. (2000) used time pressure to increase anx-
iety in their participants while they performed relational reasoning
tasks that afforded either relational matches or feature matches; it
was found that such conditions produced a greater number of
feature mappings than relational mappings (also see Waltz et al.,
19991).
However, this is not to say that relations are devoid of features,
nor that relations can be represented without them. In fact, it
has been argued that features are important for learning relations
in the ﬁrst place. DORA, a computational model of relational
development and reasoning (Doumas et al., 2008), suggests that
relations are born out of experiences with objects, their features,
and comparison. According to the model, feature variation can
be detrimental during the initial learning of a relation, but some
amount of variation is necessary to learn increasingly useful repre-
sentations (Doumas et al., 2008). For instance, a child might learn
the concept big by comparing a number of “big” things (e.g., a big
1Featural distractors can make relational reasoning more difﬁcult, at least in part,
because of human WM constraints (Richland et al., 2006; Morrison et al., 2010).
WM has often been proposed as an important component to relational reasoning
(e.g., Halford et al., 1998). Speciﬁcally, mapping between two relations requires
holding the relations in WM, and then ﬁnding structural alignments between the
objects in them (Gentner, 1983). At the same time, mappings between similar fea-
tures (and identical objects) must be actively inhibited, which taxesWM (Morrison
et al., 2010). As a result, tasks that involve relational representations typically suffer
when greater numbers of features are present (i.e., when the number of features that
must be overlooked is increased; Doumas et al., 2008; Morrison et al., 2010).
FIGURE 1 | An example of a cross-mapping problem. Imagine that one
is asked to map the shapes in the left pane to those in the right. A featural
mapping would align the two squares and the two circles, while a relational
mapping would align the top circle with the top square, and the bottom
square with the bottom circle.
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bear and a big horse). Any extraneous features that vary system-
atically with the compared items will help the child make initial
comparisons; however, those same features will also be part of the
child’s big concept. So, big learned by comparing a bear and horse
might also contain features like “animal,” “furry,” etc. Over time,
the comparison of this big representation to other representations
of big things with other sets of features, learned in other contexts
(e.g., while comparing a big house and a big boat) will reﬁne the
child’s representation of big such that it begins to exclude extra-
neous features (such as “animal” and “furry”). Thus, according
DORA, feature variation plays a fundamental role in the genesis
of relational reasoning.
Furthermore, data from language learning suggests feature vari-
ation might be helpful for learning syntax. For example, Onnis
et al. (2008) looked at the effects of variation sets in the acquisi-
tion of miniature artiﬁcial languages, and found that learning was
improved by increasing the variation of the kinds of contexts a
given lexical relationship showed up in. For example, if words C
and D are frequently presented together in a training sequence,
then the learner may eventually conclude that they form a struc-
tural phrase (i.e., simple bigram learning). However, if words C
and D are frequently presented together, and in a widely varying
set of contexts (e.g., BCD, CDE, ABCDE, CDEF, etc.), then the
learner can quite quickly infer that CD forms a structural phrase.
Thus, increasing the variation around a relationship can actually
make it easier to learn that relationship. Although Onnis et al.’s
(2008) task is not a traditional relational task, syntactic learning
(like relational reasoning) is structure-sensitive. Furthermore, the
task requires the extraction of structure froma feature-rich stream,
without prior knowledge of which features belong to the syntax
and which belong to the words instantiating the syntax—in other
words, it requires one to reason about structure while ignoring
many of the words and features.
In sum,while there exists a wealth of data on how feature-based
categories interact with feature variation, feature-based categories
differ from relational categories at a mechanistic level. However,
it is unclear how the mechanisms involved in relational cognition
interactwith feature-variation, and so it is currently unknownhow
relational-category-learningmight do so. Thus, while there is little
dedicated research on the topic of feature variation in relational
category-learning, there is good reason to believe that it is a factor
that affects learning, and should therefore shouldbe accounted for.
We propose that relational category-learning will be shaped by
the type of feature variation exhibited across the training exem-
plars. To the point, there seems to be at least two different ways
that exemplars might exhibit feature variation: ﬁrst, they could
demonstrate within-feature variation such that a single feature
is represented in many different ways across exemplars. In this
case low variation would involve fewer possible values of that fea-
ture across the training set, while greater variation would involve
the opposite. Alternatively, they could demonstrate across-feature
variation, such that more features could vary overall across exem-
plars. In this case, low variation would involve fewer varying
properties.
For instance, imagine that one needs to learn a relational cat-
egory that involves the relative spatial locations of shapes such
that membership is deﬁned by whether one shape occludes the
other at the top right of the occluded shape. Further imagine that
while these shapes can be circles or squares, the actual shapes (i.e.,
which shape is in which location) is non-predictive of category
membership – only the relational location structure is of impor-
tance (see Figure 2A for an example of what a training set for this
category might look like). In this case, shape is a varying feature
that is unimportant to category membership. Increased within-
feature variation might mean increasing the number of shapes
that could be used in the exemplars (so, instead of just circles
and squares, the shapes might be circles, squares, or triangles; see
Figure 2B). Alternatively, increased across-feature variation might
be achieved by increasing the overall number of features that var-
ied across exemplars. Thus, the shapes might vary, but now their
colors might vary also (see Figure 2C).
We expect that learning relational categories involving higher
levels of across-feature variation will have higher representational
costs, and therefore be more difﬁcult. Our logic is that when one
begins learning a relational category without direction (beyond
that a categorymust be learned), one has no choice but to begin by
guessing. That guess must involve explicitly entertaining (i.e., rep-
resenting) some feature or relationship exhibited by the stimulus,
and testing it over multiple exemplars (given that people typically
default to feature-based reasoning, this starting point will likely be
featural; see Gentner, 1989; Ratterman and Gentner, 1998; Waltz
et al., 2000; Doumas et al., 2008). If feedback is positive, then the
FIGURE 2 | An example of a hypothetical training set involving a base
variation set (A), a within-feature variation set (B), and an
across-feature variation set (C).
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category can be learned; if feedback is negative, then one can rule
out that feature or relation as the category of interest and begin
the process again with a different feature or relation.
While there is theoretically an inﬁnite number of hypothe-
ses that could be entertained, we expect that people will focus
on properties or relations that vary between exemplars: after all,
if they know that categories are generally deﬁned by some set
of shared properties, then between-exemplar differences will be
information-baring and promote comparison. This expectation is
supported by the feature-based category-learning literature, which
suggests that determining relevant properties is a necessary step
to learning (Rouder and Ratcliff, 2006; Hammer et al., 2008),
and that comparison is generally an important part of that pro-
cess (Hammer et al., 2008, 2009a,b). Furthermore, comparison
seems especially important given that relational learning models
like DORA predict that learning relies upon it (this point will be
further described below; also see Doumas et al., 2008). So, we
expect that people should notice a potential relevant property
or relation, and then compare exemplars in order to determine
whether it is category-deﬁning. Thus, varying values within a
feature would not add to the number of features that can be
entertained as a possible category-marker, however, varying val-
ues across features means that one must potentially represent
and rule out an extra possibility. This potential extra hypoth-
esis makes it seem likely that the category would be harder to
learn.
This paper will explore this account in three steps. First, it
will use the DORA model to discuss how the extra representa-
tional cost potentially associated with across-domain variation
might be represented in a cognitive system. DORA will not be
presented as the only model that might be capable of this, how-
ever, it will be used because of its relational reasoning capabilities
and, therefore, its ability to test how quickly categories can be
learned while explicitly representing both relational roles per trial
and hypotheses about category membership overall. It will then
describe an experiment in which human participants are faced
with different types of feature variation while performing a rela-
tional category-learning task. This task will look very much like
the occluding-shape example used above, and will involve a feed-
back based learning paradigm. The results will then be simulated
in DORA so that model and human performance can be com-
pared. Ultimately, it will be argued that the results from both
the human and simulation data support the representational cost
account.
THE DORA MODEL AND OBJECT FEATURES
DORA is a symbolic-connectionist model that learns structured
representations (like relations) from unstructured inputs (rep-
resented as feature vectors). DORA learns representations of
predicates describing object properties and relational roles by
comparing object feature vectors and learning explicit representa-
tions of any invariants that code for speciﬁc object properties or
roles. By dynamically binding these representations of objects and
predicates, DORA encodes features (e.g., information about an
object’s properties) and structure (e.g., information about the role
an object plays) at the same time, using the same representational
material.
DORA codes for structured representations across layers of
hierarchical nodes. In the bottom layer, a set of distributed fea-
ture nodes (called semantic units) encodes the features of objects
and relational roles in a distributed fashion. At the next layer,
localist predicate/object (PO) units combine sets of these features
to represent particular objects and relational roles. Another layer
of localist units called role-binding (RB) units then link those roles
and objects, before an ultimate top layer of localist proposition (P)
units link RB units into complete propositions (see Figure 1). For
example, features such as “y-axis,” “high” and “object,” may com-
bined at the PO level to represented above-thing, while “y-axis,”
“low” and “object”may combine to create below.2 At the next level
of the hierarchy, roles and their arguments are then conjunctively
coded at via RB units [i.e., above(square) + below(circle)], which
are then ultimately combined via a P unit (at the top of the hierar-
chy of layers) to reify complete relational expressions such as “the
square is above the circle” [or, above(square, circle)].
While conjunctively coding bindings between roles and their
ﬁllers is sufﬁcient for long-term storage, it fails catastrophically
in accounting for relational processing (see, e.g., Doumas and
Hummel, 2005). For the purposes of processing in working mem-
ory (WM), DORA, like the LISA model (Hummel and Holyoak,
1997, 2003) from which it is descended, uses time to carry binding
information inWMprocessing.While LISA uses synchrony of role
and ﬁller ﬁring to carry represent binding, DORA uses systematic
asynchrony of ﬁring (maintained at different levels of the hierar-
chy of layers representing relational propositions). For example, to
represent the binding of square to above and circle to below while
simultaneously keeping the semantics coding for role and their
ﬁllers distinct (a property necessary for learning new relations—
see Doumas et al., 2008 for a more complete discussion), DORA
might ﬁre the nodes representing above followed directly by those
representing square, and then the units represented below fol-
lowed by those representing circle. Binding information is carried
by proximity of ﬁring (with bound roles and ﬁllers ﬁring in direct
sequence), while the semantics of roles and ﬁllers are not super-
imposed and are thus the representations of roles and their ﬁllers
remain independent (see Figure 3).
Unlike LISA, though, DORA accounts for the genesis of rela-
tional structures, while LISA begins at the point that those
structures already exist. Speciﬁcally, DORA posits that compari-
son is central to the structure-learning process, allowing for shared
properties or features to be highlighted and ultimately extracted
(Doumas and Hummel, 2005; Doumas et al., 2008). In other
words, it predicts that relations are learned by comparing many
exemplars and extracting common features across them. During
comparison, common properties become more active than prop-
erties that are exhibited by only a single example, which highlights
invariants and starts a process by which DORA learns explicit
predicate representations of these invariant properties (for a full
discussion see Doumas et al., 2008).
2While we label semantic units (e.g., “low,”“object”) for the purposes of explication,
semantic units in DORA do not have any real ‘meaning’ per se, and operate like sub-
symbolic units in traditional distributed representations (e.g., McClelland, 2009).
All that matters for the purposes of DORA’s learning algorithm is that the system
is capable of encoding something invariant across instances of the same relational
concept (e.g., instances of wider or above; see Doumas et al., 2008).
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FIGURE 3 | An example of how DORA represents relational
representations, and how those representations are fired across the
model. (A) shows the model ﬁring the “above” role, while (B) shows it
ﬁring the “cup” ﬁller.
For the current simulations, we made use DORA’s retrieval,
mapping, and schema induction algorithms. These algorithms are
very similar to the corresponding algorithms in LISA (differing
only in that in DORA, they are speciﬁed for binding by asyn-
chrony rather than synchrony). As a consequence, our reported
simulations would almost certainly be possible in LISA as well.
Mapping
DORA’s mapping algorithm is as follows. In DORA, items inWM
are divided into two mutually exclusive sets for the purpose of
making comparisons (see Figure 4). The driver is the current
focus of DORA’s attention (i.e., what DORA is thinking about
right now). The recipient is items in DORA’s active memory (e.g.,
Cowan, 2001) that are available for mapping to the driver. Dur-
ing processing, items in the driver become active and ﬁre, and
role-ﬁller bindings are represented via systematic asynchrony (see
above). So, if DORA is currently thinking about a circle above
a square, the units representing higher might become active (see
Figure 4A), followed by those representing circle (so specifying
the binding of higher to circle; see Figure 4D), and then the units
for lower ﬁre followed by those representing square (so specifying
the binding of lower to square). As units in the driver become
active they impose a pattern of activation on the semantic units
(e.g., when higher is active in the driver, the semantics of higher are
active, andwhen circle is active in the driver, the semantics of circle
are active). Units in the recipient complete via lateral inhibition
to respond to the pattern of ﬁring imposed on the semantic units
by the active driver units. So, for instance, if higher is active in the
driver, and a representation of higher is present in the recipient,
because the two share so many semantics, the representation of
higher in the recipient will tend to become highly active, thereby
inhibiting the activation of other PO units in the recipient (see
Figures 4B,C). DORA’s mapping algorithm is described fully in
Doumas et al., 2008, but, in brief, when units of the same type (i.e.,
in the same corresponding layer) are active across driver and recip-
ient, DORA attempts to map them establishing positive mapping
weights between them in proportion to their mutual activation
(see Figure 4C). Consequently, if two PO units across the driver
and recipient are both highly co-active, DORA will form a strong
mapping connection between them. The upshot is that DORAwill
tend to match similar items across driver and recipient based on
shared features when no relations are present, and shared relations
when such relations are present (Hummel and Holyoak, 1997 and
Doumas et al., 2008 include full discussion of the algorithm and
why it works).
Retrieval
The retrieval algorithm inDORAworks very similarly, tomapping,
except that when no items are in the recipient, items in long-term
memory (LTM) are excited by the pattern of activation imposed
on the semantic units by the units in the driver, and no mapping
connections are formed. Rather, item in LTM become activated by
the active semantic units, and are retrieved into the recipient via
the Luce (1959) choice axiom.
Schema induction
After DORA has mapped items across the driver and recipient,
it might attempt to learn a schema from the mapping. During
schema induction, DORA ﬁres the items in the driver, which
in turn activate the items in the recipient to which they map.
DORA then learns a representation of the overlap of the mapped
PO units, that forms a more general version of the two mapped
propositions. So, for example, if DORA has mapped on-top (cup,
table) onto on-tup(hammer, toolbox), then as supported + cup and
supported + hammar became active across the driver and recipi-
ent, DORA learns a new representation of their semantic overlap,
or a representation roughly corresponding to supported + small-
object. Similarly, when supporter + table and supporter + toolbox
became active across the driver and recipient, DORA learns a
new representation of their semantic overlap, or a representa-
tion roughly corresponding to supporter + big-object. (Again, full
details of the schematisation algorithm and how it accounts for
human schema induction data are given in Hummel andHolyoak,
2003 and Doumas et al., 2008).
That said, in DORA object properties do not have to be
predicated—they can also be represented at the featural level of
an object’s representation (i.e., in the semantic units). So, one
might have a holistic representation of a big table, but not think
about how “big” it is until one needs to ﬁt it in a particularly
small room. This ability for properties to be represented explic-
itly or implicitly (depending on the attention and goals of the
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FIGURE 4 | An example of how DORA’s mapping algorithm works.
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system) is at the heart of how we predict feature-variation might
affect performance during relational category-learning. Speciﬁ-
cally, while an object might have a number of properties, those
properties can be represented implicitly (i.e., at the semantic unit
level).
In the following section we describe an experiment that we
ultimately simulated in DORA. Both the human participants and
DORA were given a relational category-learning task with dif-
ferent types of feature variation. We predicted that as features
varied, they were more likely to be represented explicitly (i.e., as
structured predicates) than features that that did not vary (which
were more likely to be represented implicitly; i.e., as distributed
features). We further expected that more across-feature varia-
tion (and therefore more explicit features) would result in slower
learning times.
EXPERIMENT
This experiment used a pictorial category-learning paradigm,
which employed simple, spatial relations and geometric shapes.
More speciﬁcally, participants were exposed to a number of exem-
plars, which depicted two shapes at a time, spatially aligned such
that they couldmatch a speciﬁc relational structure or not; the rela-
tional structure had to do with where one shape occluded another.
Participants were not aware of what the relational structure was
at the beginning of the experiment, so they would classify each
exemplar, receive feedback, and ultimately learn the relational cat-
egory through trial-and-error (see, e.g., Doumas and Hummel,
2013; Livins et al., under review).
This experiment speciﬁcally asks whether the type of fea-
ture variation has an effect on learning relational categories.
Three conditions were used to this end: the ﬁrst was a “base
variation” condition, which varied shapes and their relative loca-
tions. The second was a “within-feature variation” condition,
which increased the range of values that one of those features
could take, while the third was an “across-feature variation”
condition, which increased the number of features that varied
overall.
Ultimately then, this experiment will help us to understand:
(i) whether lower levels of variation do, in fact, help relational
category-learning, and (ii) whether increased within-feature and
across-feature variation affect relational category-learning in the
same way.
PARTICIPANTS
After attaining ethics approval from the University of Califor-
nia Merced’s IRB, participants were collected and included 137
undergraduate students from that university. They were recruited
through the school’s participant pool and received course credit for
their participation. All participants were required to have normal
or corrected-to-normal vision.
The study was an “online” study, and was hosted on an inde-
pendent website, such that participants could complete the study
at any time or from any location. The online system functions
analogously to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, and was expected to
produce the same type of data. Such data has been found to
be equally reliable to traditional in-lab methods (see Buhrmester
et al., 2011).
DESIGN
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three condi-
tions. All conditions began by having their web browser directed
to an independent website hosting the experiment. The ﬁrst page
of the site held the instructions, which told participants that they
were going to be shown a series of pairs of shapes, and that the
shapes were positioned according to some “rule.” It also stated
that they were not going to be told the “rule,” but that they
needed to determine it through the feedback provided along with
trial-and-error.
Participants then began the“training phase,”during which they
would learn a relational category. At the start of this phase, their
browser was redirected to a new page, which presented a gray
box in the center of the participant’s browser window on a white
background. The box was 700 by 500 pixels in size. At the begin-
ning of every trial, participants would see a ﬁxation cross in the
center of the box for 1500 ms, then an exemplar stimulus, which
would be displayed in the center of the box. Participants would
then respond by key press as to whether the exemplar followed the
“rule” or not. In every case, they had as much time as needed to
respond.
The exemplars, and their relational categories, were created
using simple shapes (e.g., circles and squares) and their relative
placement on the x and y-axes. More speciﬁcally, every exemplar
stimulus showed two shapes, where one shape partially occluded
the other. Categorymembershipwas decided by the location of the
occluding shape. Every occluder (in every condition) took a value
on two different relations: it could be slightly to the left or right
of the occluded shape, and it could be slightly above or below it.
Thus, every exemplar could be thought of as an “A” if the occluder
was above the occluded shape, a “B” if the occluder was below the
occluded shape, a “C” if it was to the left of the occluded shape,
and a “D” if was to the right of the occluded shape (see Figure 5).
Combining values on the two relations allowed for the creation
of relationally ambiguous stimuli since every exemplar would
FIGURE 5 | An example of how two shapes may combine to create
exemplars that have an occluder that takes a value on the “left/right”
feature or the “above/below” feature.The “left/right” feature allowed for
an exemplar to be classiﬁed as an “A” or a “B” depending on the occluder’s
placement, while the “above/below” feature allowed for an exemplar to be
classiﬁed as a “C” or a “D” depending on the occluder’s placement.
www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 129 | 7
Livins et al. Within vs. across feature differences
simultaneously exhibit more than one relation. More speciﬁcally,
A/C pairings depicted an occluder that was above and to the left
of the occluded shape, B/D pairings depicted an occluder that was
to the bottom and to the right of the occluded shape, A/D pairings
that depicted an occluder that was to the top and to right of the
occluded shape, and B/C pairings that depicted an occluder to the
bottom and to the left of the occluded shape (see Figure 6).
Importantly though, relational categories were systematically
paired during training such that half of the participants saw the
A/C combinations and B/D combinations, while the other half of
the participants saw theA/D combinations and B/C combinations.
Thus, the training phase for each participant began by randomly
selecting a pair of training rules that conﬂated a relative location
on the horizontal axis with a relative location on the vertical axis
(i.e., A/C and B/D, or A/D and B/C). One rule pair would be ran-
domly associated with a left-key, and the other to a right-key, such
that every exemplar stimulus could be classiﬁed dichotomously.
Participants were told whether they were “correct” or “incorrect”
after every key press.
Given that each exemplar conﬂated a value on two different
relations, participants in all conditions could learn a horizontal
rule, a vertical rule, or both rules. For instance, if a participant’s
training rules were A/C and B/D, where A/C was assigned to the
left-key, then she could learn one of three things: (i) that the
left-key needed to be pressed whenever the occluder was to the
left of the occluded shape, (ii) that left-key needed to be pressed
whenever the occluder was above the occluded shape, or (iii) that
left-key needed to be pressed whenever the occluder was above
and to the right of the occluded shape.
The speciﬁc shapes in a given trial were selected at random, cre-
ating non-predictive shape selections; however, the speciﬁc shapes
did vary by condition. To the point, the base-variation condition
had circles and squares, each white with a 2-pixel black outline.
Each trial randomly assigned a circle or a square to be the occluding
shape, and a circle or a square to be the occluded shape. As a result,
each trial could contain a circle and a square, a circle and a circle,
or a square and a square. The within-feature variation condition
increased the number of values that the“shape” feature could take.
Thus, it had a greater number of shapes that could vary, including
circles, squares, triangles, and hexagons. Like in the base-variation
FIGURE 6 | Examples of exemplars that combine a value on the
left/right relation with a value on the above/below relation. As
depicted, each exemplar takes a value on both relations. A/C has the
occluder above and to the left of the occluded object, B/D has it below and
to the right of it, A/D has it above and to the right, and B/C has it below and
to the left.
condition, each shape could appear with itself, or any other shape.
The across-feature variation conditionmatched the base-variation
condition on shape variation (i.e., it had circles and squares), but
added color as a varying feature. The colors included white and
dark purple (both of which had a black outline, like in the other
conditions). The colors of each shape randomly varied like the
shapes themselves, and so trials could include a white and a purple
shape in either occluding role, or alternatively two shapes of the
same color.
There are three important things to note about these condi-
tions. First, the variation in each condition was achieved across
trials. Thus, any single exemplar in all conditions necessarily had
more features than noted above – for instance, shape size, opac-
ity, etc. However, these features did not vary across exemplars or
conditions, and so their presence or absence could not account
for performance differences. Second, the two higher-variation
conditions displayed an equal number of possible feature-value
combinations: the within-feature variation condition allowed for
each shape to be presented along with a copy of itself, and with
each other shape, totaling 10 possible feature combinations. Like-
wise, the across-feature variation condition allowed each color
to be represented in each shape, in each color, also totaling 10
possible combinations (see Table 1 for possible combinations).
Thus, performance differences could not be due to combinato-
rial differences and the extra variation that would come with such
differences—the only difference between the conditions was the
number of varying features, and the number or type of manifesta-
tions that those features could instantiate. Finally, in all cases, the
shapes and their colors were non-predictive of the relational rule,
and so were not predictive of category membership.
Participants continued to see pairs of shapes, and get feedback
until they learned a rule well enough to correctly classify ten trials
in a row. If a participant answered a trial incorrectly, the counter
reset to zero. The counter was displayed at the top of the screen as
a participant progressed. If the participant failed to reach criterion
in 100 trials or less, they were directed to a ﬁnishing screen and
completed no further classiﬁcation tasks.
If the participant did reach criterion, then she moved on to the
“testing phase.” She was told that she would continue to see pairs
of shapes, but that all feedback as to whether she was correct or
incorrect would stop. Participants were also instructed to continue
to use the same rule that they had learned during training for the
remainder of the experiment.
The test phase then began and participants were presented with
a random order of 28 trials. These trials were made up of seven
exemplars of each possible category combination, such that they
included A/C, A/D, B/C, and B/D shape alignments. Thus, half
of the test phase required participants to replicate their ability
to classify the exemplars of their training rules, and the other
half required them to generalize that rule to novel exemplars.
Furthermore, participants’ responses on the novel exemplars also
indicated which rule they learned, since it would indicate which
training category the participant thought the novel pair was like,
and therefore whether they learned the“above” relational category
or the “beside” relational category.
For example, suppose that a participant had been trained on
A/C and B/D, where A/C had been associated with a left-key
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Table 1 | A table depicting all possible shape combinations that a participant could see by condition.
Condition Feature combinations
Base variation Circle + Square | Circle + Circle | Square + Square
Within-feature variation Circle + Circle | Square + Square | Triangle +Triangle | Pentagon + Pentagon | Circle + Square | Circle +Triangle |
Circle + Pentagon | Square +Triangle | Square + Pentagon | Triangle + Pentagon
Across-feature variation White Circle + White Circle | White Square + White Square | Purple Circle + Purple Circle | Purple Square + Purple Square |
White Circle + White Square | Purple Circle + Purple Square |White Circle + Purple Square | Purple Circle + White Square |
White Circle + Purple Circle | White Square + Purple Square
press, and B/D had been associated with a right-key press. For
the generalization portion of the testing phase, novel A/D and B/C
pairs could be used to determine which rule the participant had
learned: if presented with an A/D pairing, then a left-key press
would indicate that the participant was classifying the stimulus
to be like the A/C pair. If A/C and A/D pairs are classiﬁed in
the same way, then the participant must be attending to the
above/below relation (since the left-key is the common relational
value between them, representing cases where the occluder was
above the occluded shape). Along the same lines, a right-key press
would indicate that the participant was classifying by the “beside”
rule (See Figure 7). While the study was not primarily concerned
with which rule participants learned, the ability to determine
which rule each participant learned was instrumental in deter-
mining generalization accuracy and ability (i.e., if they learned one
rule, how accurately can they classify the novel exemplars by that
rule?).
Once testing was complete, participants were directed to a ﬁnal
screen where they were asked to type in the rule that they learned
in ﬁfty characters or less.
This design allowed us to collect data on four measures of
relational category-learning. First, we measured whether partic-
ipants learned any rule at all within 100 trials (i.e., overall rule
learning). Second, for those that did learn a rule within 100 trials,
FIGURE 7 | An example of a possible training set and test phase
exemplar. Imagine the participant was trained on A/C and B/D exemplars,
where an “left-key” press was paired with A/C, and an “right-key” press
was paired with B/D. If a participant were then shown an A/D exemplar
during the test phase, then an “left-key” press would indicate that A/D was
classiﬁed in the same way as an A/C exemplar, while a “right-key” press
would indicate that it was classiﬁed in the same way as a B/D.
we measured the number of trials required to learn that rule (i.e.,
speed of rule acquisition). Third, we measured the speed at which
participants reacted during rule learning (i.e., response latency of
classiﬁcation while learning). And ﬁnally, we measured the degree
to which participants could accurately generalize the rule to novel
exemplars during the test phase (i.e., testing robustness).
RESULTS
A participant’s performance on trained exemplars during the
testing phase was used to determine whether she had learned
the rule well enough to continue applying it without feedback.
Thus, a participant was classiﬁed as a “rule learner” if she: (i)
achieved the criterion of 10 consecutive correct responses during
the training phase, and ii) did not incorrectly classify more than
four of the 14 exemplars representing their training rules during
the test trials (i.e., she accurately classiﬁed training exemplars with
more than 71% accuracy). Any participant that did not meet these
two criteria was classiﬁed as a “non-rule learner” for subsequent
analysis.
The only exceptions to these criteria were the dual-rule learners
(i.e., those that were considered to have learned both rules) since
their test data can look analogous to participants that learned
nothing at all. As a result, we relied on their typed answer of a rule.
Thus, they were considered to have learned both rules only if they
met the above criteria, and also explicitly stated that they learned
both the above/below relation and the beside relation. With that
criterion in mind, we can specify how participants performed on
the four measures outlined in the experiment.
First, with regard to overall rule learning, a chi-square test
revealed that there was a signiﬁcant difference in howmany partic-
ipants learned a rule across conditions [χ(2) = 10.725, p< 0.01].
In detail, the base-variation condition had 7 of its 42 participants
(16.67%) fail to learn, the within-feature variation condition had
17 out of its 41 participants (41.46%) fail to learn, and the across-
feature variation condition had 26 of its 54 participants (48.14%)
fail to learn (see the “human data” portion of Figure 8). These
values suggest that learning is much easier in the base-variation
condition than in the two other conditions that increase variation
in the stimuli.
At this point, it is important to notice that further calcula-
tions involving the data from non-rule learners are impossible:
each of the following statistics will involve comparing perfor-
mance during learning in order to determine which condition
produced the greatest levels of learning difﬁculty. However,
non-rule learners never actually learned anything, and so such
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FIGURE 8 |The proportion of rule learners organized by condition for
both DORA and the human participants.
values are impossible to predict. As a result, non-rule learn-
ing participants have been removed from further statistical
analyses.
Second, with regard to the number of trials required for
rule acquisition, a one-way ANOVA revealed that the number
of trials that participants took to learn the rule was signiﬁ-
cantly different across conditions [F(2,84) = 7.420, p < 0.01].
A Bonferroni post hoc test showed that this difference was non-
signiﬁcant (p = 1.00) between the base-variation condition
(M = 29.09, SD = 20.32) and the within- feature variation con-
dition (M = 27.92, SD = 20.60), however, the base-variation
and the within- feature variation conditions both showed sig-
niﬁcantly faster acquisition rates (p < 0.01 in both cases) than
the across- feature variation condition (M = 47.43, SD = 23.08;
see Figure 9).
Third, with regard to reaction times during the training trails,
after reaction timesmore than 3 SDs from themeanwere removed,
another one-way ANOVA showed that there was a signiﬁcant
difference between conditions [F(2,84) = 4.414, p < 0.05]. A
Bonferroni post hoc test showed that the base-variation condition
(M =1.78, SD=0.65) had a signiﬁcantly fastermean reaction time
than the across-feature variation condition (M = 3.00, SD= 2.61;
p< 0.05), however, it was not signiﬁcantly faster than the within-
feature variation condition (M = 2.62, SD = 1.22; p = 0.37).
Therewas also no signiﬁcant difference between thewithin-feature
and across-feature conditions for this measure (p = 0.185; see
Figure 10).
Finally, with regard to performance on the generalization
questions during the testing phase (i.e., those with novel exem-
plars), it was found that accuracy rates by condition were not
signiﬁcantly different (M = 12.54, SD = 1.54 for the base-
variation condition; M = 12.37, SD = 1.91 for the within-
feature condition; M = 12.86, SD = 1.86 for the across-feature
condition; a one-way ANOVA showed that F(2,84) = 0.518,
p = 0.597.
THE SIMULATIONS
Wemodeled the previously described category-learning paradigm
in DORA. Again, we do not claim that DORA is the only
model that may account for these results; rather, our claim is
simply that varying an extraneous feature’s variability makes a
relational category harder to learn, and that across-feature varia-
tion has a more negative impact on learning than within-feature
variation.
FIGURE 9 |The mean number of trials required for rule acquisition by
condition in the human conditions. Error bars represent the means plus
or minus the SEs.
FIGURE 10 |The mean reaction times during training trails organized
by condition. Error bars represent the means plus or minus the SEs.
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The simulation proceeded as follows. DORA began with a
repository of representations stored in LTM.These representations
included predicates describing object properties (e.g., color and
shape) and spatial relations [e.g., next-to(x, y) and above (x, y)]3.
On each trial we represented the current problem in the driver
using a set of relevant predicates (see below) sampled from LTM.
DORA then attempted to retrieve previous exemplars from LTM
to match the current exemplar, and ﬁnally attempted to map the
current exemplar on to those retrieved exemplars. If DORA man-
aged tomap the current exemplar onto a previously seen exemplar,
it “answered”with the category of the mapped previous exemplar.
If DORAwas correct, it generated a schema based on the mapping
(i.e., it tried to create a more general representation of a category
member). If it was incorrect, it simply recorded the category label
of the current exemplar as a semantic unit and stored the exemplar
in LTM.
In the “base variation” condition, only shapes and their relative
locations varied. To simulate this condition, each new exemplar
could be coded using predicates describing its relative location and
its shape, and an implicit feature (i.e., a semantic unit) describ-
ing its color. In the “within-feature variation” condition the range
of values that the “shape” feature could take was increased. To
simulate this condition, the current exemplar could be coded with
predicates describing its spatial location, its shape (with the greater
range), and an implicit property representing its color. Finally, in
the “across-feature variation” condition the number of features
that varied overall increased. To simulate this condition, the cur-
rent exemplar could be coded using any of three explicit predicates
(e.g., shapes, their relative locations, and colors). The structure of
our simulations followed from our assumption that the predicat-
ing (i.e., explicitly representing) a particular feature is more likely
when that feature has some variation. So, in a condition where all
shapes were white, predicating color was more unlikely than in a
conditionwere color varied between shapes. This assumption rests
on empirical results indicating that explicitly predicating the value
on a feature is much more likely when two items with different
values on that feature are compared (see Doumas and Hummel,
2013). The assumption also follows fromDORA’s processing algo-
rithm, where detecting a difference requires that compared objects
do not share some particular feature. For each of the three condi-
tions, we ran 100 iterations of learning instances, simulating 100
participants per condition.
DORA went through a series of learning iterations (epochs)
until the model succeeded on 10 classiﬁcations in a row
(i.e., it mapped to the correct relational category) or until it
3Importantly, DORA learned all of the explicit predicate representations of different
shapes [e.g., circle(x)], colors [e.g., red(x)], and spatial relations [e.g., above(x,y)]
from examples of objects of various shapes and colors in various spatial conﬁgura-
tions used in these simulations. The learning simulations DORA’s predicate learning
algorithm (see Doumas et al., 2008), and proceeded just like various other predi-
cate learning simulations we have run in several other studies (e.g., Doumas et al.,
2008; Doumas and Hummel, 2010). We do not describe these simulations in detail
here because DORA’s ability to learn new predicates is actually quite tangential to
the main purpose of exploring how already learned properties can affect relational
category-learning. We note them only because it is important to note that the rep-
resentations used in the next part of the simulation were learnable by the model,
and emerged as the natural consequence of model’s proposed predicate discovery
algorithm. Excruciating details of how DORA learns new predicates can be found
in Doumas et al., 2008).
FIGURE 11 | DORA’s average number of trials taken to learn a rule.
reached 100 epochs. DORAs performance on the two mea-
sures that were signiﬁcant in the human data were tracked—
whether or not learning occurred (by meeting the classiﬁ-
cation criterion) and the number of trials taken to meeting
criterion.
RESULTS
Mirroring the human data, DORA performed best in the base-
feature variation condition, moderately in the within-feature
variation condition, and worst in the across-feature variation con-
dition on bothmeasures. Speciﬁcally, the base-variation condition
took an average of 23 trials to reach criterion during training, with
a 97% overall learning rate; the within-feature variation condition
took an average of 38 trials to reach criterion, with a 67% overall
learning rate; and ﬁnally, the across-feature variation condition
took an average of 51 trials to reach criterion, with only a 58%
overall learning rate.
Figure 8 depicts DORAs performance in comparison to the
human data. Likewise, Figure 11 depicts DORAs average number
of trials per condition. A visual analysis of these graphs shows that
DORAperformed analogously to the human participants. In brief,
these simulates support our hypothesis that increased variation in
relational category-learning is more adversely affected when the
variation comes from across- feature than when it comes from
within a feature of interest.
DISCUSSION
The goal of this paper has been to investigate the effects of feature
variation in relational category-learning. We speciﬁcally reasoned
that relational category-learning should be affected by the type
of feature variation present in the training set, and we expected
that across-feature variation would make learning more challeng-
ing than within-feature variation. This expectation was grounded
in the fact that both relational learning and learning a category
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from feedback involve detecting similarities and differences across
exemplars, and comparison across the training set (Doumas et al.,
2008; Hammer et al., 2008, 2009a,b). Thus, the additional varying
feature inherent to the across-feature variation condition offers
an entirely new feature to rule out with regard to its potential
diagnosticity for category membership, while within-feature vari-
ation does not. For example, in this experiment, if one were to
rule out “shape” as the predicting factor of category membership,
then the within-feature variation group would have no more fea-
tures to have to consider and rule out. The across-feature variation
group, by contrast,might still need to consider and rule out“color”
as well, forcing them to take longer to hone in on the impor-
tant relational structure. Markman and Maddox (2003) suggest a
similar possibility in the case of feature-based category-learning
tasks.
Given that it is often difﬁcult to derive what mechanisms were
involved in a given behavior, we used DORA as a way of testing
whether such a process could produce our expected results and
mirror the performance seen in our human participants. In short,
it did.
To begin with, both our human and model data suggest that
less variation is better overall. This conclusion is reﬂected in the
learning rates, and in the fact that the base-variation condition
had a much higher proportion of rule learners than did the other
conditions. However, the results also suggest that within-feature
and across-feature variation do not affect rule learning in the same
way. To the point, the speed of rule acquisition among rule learners
in the within-feature variation group was on par with that of the
base-variation group, whereas the across-feature variation group
showed much slower rule acquisition rates. This trend was also
seen in the human reaction times during rule-learning, where the
base-variation group was only signiﬁcantly faster than the across-
feature variation group. Interestingly though, once participants
learned the rules, there was no difference among groups in their
ability to generalize to novel exemplars. Thus, feature variation
seems to affect rule learning more than rule application.
Thus, it is interesting that this study points out a similarity
between feature-based and relational categories. A large body of
literature has described relational categories as qualitatively and
functionally unique from feature-based categories (e.g., Gentner,
2005; Gentner andKurtz, 2005); however, the results of the present
experiment suggest that both types of categorization are sensitive
to feature variation, and both are sensitive to the type of feature
variation exhibited in the training exemplars.
We do not suggest that this research is exhaustive by anymeans,
and we acknowledge that open questions remain. For instance,
the task used involved a rather low amount of variability in simple
stimuli; it seems prudent to test whether the results found here will
scale up to stimuli that are more complex or to greater amounts
of variability. Furthermore, category-learning represents only one
type of relational processing. It would be interesting to ask how
different types of feature variability affect other tasks. For example,
as discussed earlier, cross-mapping analogy problems are difﬁcult
because they use identical or highly similar objects in different
roles across the base and the target analog. It seems reasonable to
question how varying levels and types of feature variation between
the base and target would affect mapping.
Despite open questions though, this paper has begun to explore
the relationship between relational category-learning anddifferent
types of feature variation. We conclude that both quantity and
quality of the variation in a training set can signiﬁcantly affect
learning, and that a reasonable explanation for this difference is
a disparity in the representational cost associated with each type
of variation. Thus, future relational category-learning paradigms
may need to consider how and where they implement feature
variation.
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